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Crime and
Survival:
Some Basic
Reflections
by Otto R. Begus
(Chairman, Department of
Philosophy, Morgan State
University)

Sociological statistics indicate high
crime rates in our society. The assertion
that they are high is, of course, not
merely a question of numbers. There is
an acute awareness of crime which surfaces in the explicit inclusion of security
measures in housing and urban developments, reminiscent of the walled
cities and fortified castles of the Middle
Ages, in the flight of people to "safe"
areas, in the establishment of predelinquency programs whose detailed
record-keeping methods at least equal
those dreamed up in the better-known
futuristic novels, in psychological
theories and educational practices such
as "Behavior Modification," and also in
the innumerable police and detective
shows on television. Even if one allows
for a certain ingrained societal pessimism, the proportions of this awareness and the seriousness of its practical
consequences alone suggest an abnormal presence of crime.
The presence of crime in any given
society, however, is, by itself, not an abnormal phenomenon. In other words: as
long as crime in a society occurs in more
or less clearly identifiable individual
forms and isolated incidents, the search
for an explanation can confine itself to
individual
circumstances
and
rationale - although not reasonable
choices. Such a form of crime is neither
an indication of social disease nor does it
represent an substantial threat. When,
however, criminal activity appears as a
widespread phenomenon, when there is
what can be called a climate of criminal
activity, which cannot be reduced to a
simple addition of individual criminal actions, the quest for an explanation can-

not end with the individual. Indeed, the
frequency, the almost indeliberate ease
with which crimes are committed even
for minimal gains somehow suggest the
existence of a social context within which
criminal actions constitute meaningful
phenomena, or what is the same, a
meaningful mode of social action. But
how can actions which are apparently
against society be socially meaningful?
The question points to society and to an
inter-wovenness of individual and social
existence. What is the nature of this interrelatedness?
In accordance with the theories proposed by Hobbes and Locke, society is
the result of a social contract. Taking this
terminology seriously, this means that:
a. the parties to the contract must
exist before the contract is entered
and, therefore, also before society
which comes into being by it. The
"before" does not necessarily
mean "before in time." Rather it
indicates that the parties exist, first
and above all, as individuals independently of any society and that
human existence does not eo ipso
imply social existence;
b. the parties enter into the social
contract freely, i.e., by choice.
Thus, society does not arise from
necessity. It appears to be simply
one of the means available to hu~
mans to obtain their individual
goals. The fact that one means,
namely society, appears to be better, than the other - force - does
not make the first necessary.
It is already commonplace knowledge
that the social contract theory was
prompted by historical circumstances
and by special group interests: in the
case of Hobbes, to safeguard absolute
authOrity by pointing out that there must
be an impartial, stable and powerful enforcer of such a contract, or, as in the
case of Locke, to promote the political
potentialization of the bourgeoisie. But
precisely because this theory, which in
the meantime has become an important
element of our own socia-political
awareness, arises from particular interests, it is a highly unreliable source of
socia-political intelligence. If we let the
social phenomenon speak for itself, the

following elements appear:
1. The process of humanization:
Human beings can only come into
the fruition of their human potentialities in relation with other
human beings who have already
developed these characteristics, as
well as in relation with a human
environment that promotes their
realization. Thus, social relations
are a necessary condition of
human existence qua human.
2. The process of socialization:
Human goals and aspirations or, in
other words, the realization of
human existence as survival and as
the "better" life, exceed the powers
of the individual. This excess is not
simply the result of utopian
dreams. Hume, in comparing humans with the endowment of animals, finds the first at a disadvantage: "Of all the animals with
which the globe is populated there
is none towards which nature
seems, at first sight, to have
exercised more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless
wants and necessities with which
she has loaded him, and in the
slender means which she affords to
the relieving of these necessities ...
*(Hume, Political Essays) However,
there is, in accordance with Hume,
a remedy to this situation: "It is by
society alone that he is capable of
supplying his defects ... By society
all his infirmities are compensated ... When every individual labors
apart and only for himself, his force
is too small to execute any considerable work ... Society provides a
remedy for the following three inconvenience: by the conjunction of
forces our power is augmented, by
the partition of employment, our
ability increases, and by mutual
succour we are less exposed to fortunes and accidents." (Hume,Political Essays) If we radicalize Hume's
statement in view of the fact that
the very possibility of human
existence is rooted in this conjunction of forces, abilities and concerns and in view of the probability
that the survival of the human
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species itself is due to social interaction, social relations are not
only advantageous but a necessary
condition of human existence qua
existence.
Social relations, or as we can also say,
society, reveal itself in these two elements as a necessary condition of
human existence. In sofar as these social
relations received their structure from
the actual interaction of human beings
among themselves and with their envi·
ronment, the concrete historical form,
the intrinsic quality and the external
structural support (customs, habits,
laws) of these relations is determined by
interests as well as material possibilities.
Thus, although society is a'necessary
condition of human existence from the
point of view of human existence, society can deny being this condition to individuals and groups that exist within its
confines, who then are de-humanized
into tools, living tools as Aristotle calls
them, or to useless surplus. From this a
contradiction results: on the one hand
these groups or individuals are members
of the same social habitat whose meaning to them, as necessitated by their
human condition, is their humanization
and socialization. On the other hand,
however, this very social habitat denies
them this meaning and, therefore, its reality. In consequence of this contradiction, actions which appear to be antisocial form the point of view of this established social habitat can be socially
meaningful to the perpetrator of these
actions, precisely because it is an attempted realization of what society
necessarily means, but to them is not yet.
It must be pointed out here that this
does not indicate that the perpetrator of
such actions must be refleXively aware of
this contradiction. Where this reflexive
awareness is lacking, he is simply acting
out an existential situation in a necessarily egocentric manner. The criminal
phenomenon, which formed the basis of
our question, has already steered us
away from those trends that would seek
its explanation in genes, chromosomes
cor in a feeling of inadequacy based on
corporeal
differences.
Certain
sociologists have begun to point at the
social environment as a possible source
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of crime. Two factors are usually mentioned:
1. The Family. The theory that the
breakdown of the family is responsible
for the rise in crime implies correctly the
absence of a supportive social habitat.
But it fails to mention that in our advanced industrial society the family is
radically incapable of providing this type
of social habitat because many basic social relations have become "public." For
that very reason, the focus on the
present-day family and its restoration as
a fundamental solution to crime and
other socially disturbing phenomena, is
totally anachronistic. It uses that family
as a model which was at the same time a
center of production, or, in other words,
a socio-economic unit. In pre-industrial
societies, the family, whether feudal or
otherwise, was an almost independent
and to a large degree self-sufficient social
body. In fact, meeting head-on with such
family-based societies, the industrial
evolution, which destroyed at the same
time a democratically more hopeful but
never fully respected socio-economic
family unit based on home-industry, had
to cause havoc. When it occurred, society was totally unprepared and, because
of prevailing interests, totally uninterested in providing an extra-familiar
social habitat. In fact, it considered the
rising proletariat as "panderers of vice,"
"mobs" and "social sores" (Jefferson,
on Democracy) as it had considered
those who had been unattached hirelings as rootless scum. Even the to some
extent softening, albeit self-interested,
oppressive paternalism which had
existed between rulers and ruled in the
feudal family, was now gone, replaced
by totally impersonalized and dehumanized relations between owners
and workers, although the social reformers of the Victorian Age, witness
Charles Dickens, attempted to transfer
this paternalism to the factories and offices. Slavery is, of course, the most radical expression of the absence of a meaningful social habitat since it does not
even fall under the category of feudal
family-relations.
2. Poverty. Some sociologists have
come to the conclusion, again correctly
in its over-all meaning, that poverty is the

primary source of crime. This theory has
to be qualified, since there are several
types of poverty, quite distinct from one
another: there is, first, poverty due to a
general scarcity of resources even if
these are justly distributed. Second,
there is poverty by choice (mendicant
friars in their early stages, buddhist
monks, as well as financially highly unrewarding activities such as art can be, or
the practice of medicine in economically
extremely depressed areas), and third,
poverty due to a socioeconomic system
whose very reason of existence is the accumulation of wealth which, against the
background of the private ownership of
the sources of production translates into
an accumulation of wealth by some and
the deprivation of others as its necessary
correlative. In view of these three types
of poverty, poverty as such does not yet
constitute a condition of criminal activity.
It seems reasonable to suggest that the
insufficiency of means to survive, or to
survive humanly and within the standards made possible by the general social productivity as one of the
experienced forms of frustrated rightful
social expectation may make actions
meaningful, if not necessary, which result in the appropriation of the survival
means outside the established forms of
acquisition or the established rules of the
market-place.
3. Moral Depravity. Widespread
popular opinion maintains that the rise in
crime results from the materialistic outlook of our age. It is, of course, true that
the experienced frustration of rightful
social expectations can be sublimated by
means of various ideologies. It is also
true that some of these ideologies may
acquire survival-functions. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "blessed be the
poor" lent dignity to the oppressed. But
the farmers' uprising in Central Europe
in the XVIth Century, for example, is a
good indication of the fact that an ideology of "blessed be the poor" and
"slaves, be obedient to your masters"
cannot assuage the conflict between social expectation and social reality, even if
this conflict is proposed as an expression
of God's will. Thus, in fact, the materialistic outlook of our age, especially
when it appears among oppressed

groups, does not constitute a perversion
at all, but rather a reaUstic appraisal of a
situation which hitherto had been hidden under a "non-materiaUstic" ideology.
With the waning influence of religion
as a sublimating force, another ideology
seems to take hold, which found its early
expression in the doctrine of "Social
Darwinism" of which Hitler is the most
radical representative: in accordance
with it, the degree of socio-economic
participation, or social standing as Herrenstein of Harvard University puts it, is
said to be determined by nature and its
laws of the "survival of the fittest" (or
today the "genes") and genetically determined behavior}. Who, this theory
seems to imply, could possibly quarrel
with nature (or the genes)?
Hobbes, one of the proposers of the
social contract theory, conceived the establishment of society as a remedy of the
natural situation of man, referred to as
the "bellum omnium contra omes": the
war of everyone against every-one: the
lone animal, defending its turf. Since this
pre-social existence lies beyond human
experience, post-Hobbesian theoreticians maintained that Hobbes had simply taken recourse to a kind of
philosophical fiction a la Socrates, in
order to delineate in all clarity the significance and the essence of the social contract.
However, if we take the Hobbesian
description of pre-societal existence as a
description of asocietal existence,
namely human existence as deprived of
a humanizing and socializing habitat that
his existence demands, it ceases to be fiction and becomes fact. Indeed, Hobbes
himself, in order to refer to an
experience of this war-like condition,
mentions examples that are taken out of
British society. Let us examine some details of this description: After having
stated that the condition of perpetual
war does not lie so much in the various
overt acts of war but rather in a continuous presence of those conditions that
give rise to these acts, Hobbes continues: "Whatsoever is consequent to a
time of war where every man is enemy to
every man, the same is consequent to
the time wherein men live without other

security that what their own strength and
their own invention shall furnish them
withal." (Hobbes, LeViathan) What is
this security? It consists in an unobstructed access to the means of survival. Survival itself is not a definite quantum. Rather, it is determined by the general productivity and the forms of progress. It implies, therefore, the standards
of decent existence which vary from age
to age. Generally, this access to the
means of survival occurs through a participation in their production. Where this
participation is basically frustrated,
human survival security is threatened
and the individual is left to its own devices. The resulting survival-solitude has
obvious de-humaniZing consequences
which result in these charactenstics, put
forth by Hobbes: "In such condition,
there is no place for industry... and,
which is worst of all, continual fear of
danger and violent death; and the Ufe of
man or woman solitary, brutish, poor,
nasty and short." (Hubbes, Leviathan)
Furthermore: "T 0 this war of
everyone against everyone, this also is
consequent: that nothing can be unjust.
The notions of right and wrong, justice
and injustice, have there no place.
Where there is no common power, there
is no law, no injustice." (Hobbes,
Leviathan) The common power refers to
the agreed institutionalized form of protecting the established social relations
and the benefits derived therefrom. This
common power, as well as the laws that
constitute the modus vivendi of the
societal establishment, has lost its meaning to those who live at the fringes of society and who are alienated from these
benefits. To them, then, this common
power is nothing else but the power of
the hostile other whose exercise of
power is experienced simply as force
and fraud and must be fought with the
same, as Hobbes says, "cardinal virtues
in war." (LeViathan)
Precisely because this common power
and these common laws are common
only in appearance but not in reality and
meaning, the medicine of more lawenforcement and a more radical use of
power addresses itself only to
symptoms. And finally, Hobbes concludes with words that need no com-

mentary: "It is consequent also that the
same condition that there be no property, no dominion, no mine and thine
distinct; but only to be every man's that
he can get, and for long as he can keep it.
And thus much for the ill condition which
man by nature is actually placed in."
(Leviathan) It is, as we may alter Hobbes' statement, notan ill condition bynature, but a humanly produced denial of
society to humans.
Of course, the lines of societal deprivation cannot be drawn with mathematical
or statistical accuracy. In fact, a society
that engenders oppreSSion is in itself
questionable and fraught with internal
contradictions that affect every member.
But it is one of the forms of selfprotection that society will forego any
radical self-reflection and rather point to
the asocial element as being its own
source of its asocial behavior. The
down-playing of white-collar crime, the
lack of understanding in view of the rise
of juvenile delinquency everywhere, the
continuous attempts to reduce crimes in
the very power-structurer to personal
failure and ambition are but some of
the consequences of this lack of selfreflection. In fact, history is filled with testimonies to this self-interested unwillingness to pay attention to its own condition
as well as to its apocalyptic consequences. And when it is done,it is most
likely written off as disgruntled dissent,
pessimism of the intellectuals, sourgrapes attitude, or, in our post Freudian
age, a result of wrong potty-training.
This brief phenomenology of the asocial condition would not be complete
without a look at its self-expression. Although there are many examples of it, in
fact, popular culture is filled with them, I
venture to choose "Martin Fierro," an
Argentinian gaucho poem because of its
directness, simplicity and nonromaticizing quality.
After killing the protege of the military
commander of the region where Martin
Fierro had worked for some time, he reflects on the condition of the gaucho,
providing thereby an explanation of his
behavior. The following verses are taken
from Song VIII: (J~se Hernandez, Martin

Fierro)

MARCH,1976

Since I could not expect justice here,
I left qUitely the inn
so as not to be noticed
when I saw him die and
the innkeeper started to raise his
voice.
Oppressed people know very well the
difference between true justice and the
appearance of justice. Plato, in a dispute
on justice with Thrasymarchus brings
forth the same distinction. Perhaps oppressed people cannot formulate it as
well, but they know. Thus, Martin Fierro's flight is simply an act of selfconservation in the face of tyranny.
I climbed the horse and prayed to God
and left for a different territory.
Since the gaucho is called a bum
He cannot have a home.
From place to place he must move
Never finding peace.
He is always in flight,
Always poor and persecuted;
He has no resting-place, no cave
as if he were damned;
Indeed, to be a gaucho, damn-it,
To be a gaucho is a crime.

The extemal rootlessness is only an
expression of societal deprivation or
societal rootlessness. Furthermore, the
respectless image of the gaucho, the
criminal, the oppressed is their alienation: they must live the imposed image
which, in tum, becomes their fate: identification with the ideology of oppression
where each attempt to break away from
it results in a necessarily hostile action
against the oppressor.
He has no children, no wife,
no friends, and no protectors.
All are his masters,
but no one will shield him.
He suffers the fate of the ox:
what happens to it if he does not pull
the plow?
His condition is solitary. Exploited by
everyone, everyone becomes his
enemy: the war of everyone against
everyone is, in fact, the war of the isolated one for survival against the societal
other which excludes him as an equal
participant. Only to appease his masters
does he accept his designated position,
but even so this only serves to perpetuate his suffering.
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His house is the hay-stack,
his den the desert;
And if, half-dead with hunger,
he catches a piglet,
they run after him
because he is a gaucho thief.
Indeed, no mine and thine, as Hobbes
says, because the thine holds power
over everything, even over the basic
means of survival of the oppressed.
He gains nothing when there is peace,
And when there is war, he is the first to
go;
They do not forgive him when he is
mistaken,
because they do not know how to forgive.
The gaucho in this world is only useful
at the polls.
In fact, the condition of society means
nothing to him since it does not affect
him. War or peace, the fate of the oppressed is the same. Nor does he profit
from political freedom, the right to vote,
since the interests that determine the
exercise of political power have already
b.een determined. His disinterest in society is a sign of his societal deprivation. In
fact, it reminds him of his utter powerlessness, as the next verse indicates:
For him are the stockades
the hard prisons.
In his mouth there are no reasons
Although he might have reason
enough to speak.
But, the reasons of the poor.
Are like wooden bells.
Let's go, fate, let's go together!
Together we were borne
and together we must live,
unable to separate.
So, I l,.I,ill open with my knife
the path I have to follow.
Every exit to a meaningful existence
within a meaningful sodal habitat
blocked, he must resort to the raw and
naked weapons of survival, "force" a
cardinal virtue in the war of everyone
against everyone. The fact that Martin
Fierro refers to his condition as fate, as
an unfortunate but unalterable fact, indicates that he simply acts out his oppressed condition which turns this reflection
into a lamentation rather than a reflection. It is a lamentation, however, which

expresses the components of asocial
existence: historical rootlessness, lack of
respect, self-alienation, material alienation, self-affirmation through physical
violence, survival by force and fraud,
and despair. How did Hobbes express
it? "In such condition, there is no place
for industry ... and which is the worst of
all, continual fear of danger and violent
death; and the life of humans solitary,
brutish, poor, nasty and short."
(Leviathan)
The purpose of these reflections was
to expose the relationship between criminal actions as perpetrated by individuals
and society. In fact, every action is an action of an individual. However, the individual exists from its very beginning as a
social individual. Thus, the absence or
presence of a habitat where this dimension can be lived out is of vital importance to the way in which human
existence realizes itself.
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A Brief History

of the
University of
Baltimore
by James F. Schneider

For as many years as there has been a
University of Baltimore, there has been a
University of Baltimore School of Law.
The law school and a business school
were founded together in the summer of
1925 to fill a widespread public demand
for a quality professional education.
The establishment of the University
came in response to actions taken by
already-existing institutions of higher
education in the Baltimore area. In the
middle 1920' s, the University of Maryland lengthened its evening law program
to four years and began to require two

years of college as a prerequisite to law
school; Johns Hopkins added two years
to its Commerce School course. Rising
standards of admission meant that many
competent people would be prevented
from obtaining a legal or business education.
These changes seemed entirely unnecessary at a time when the only requirements for admission to the bar were
a high school diploma and a law degree;
many practical members of the legal and
business communities refused to accept the changes.
A meeting of indignant citizens was
called in June 1925 at the University
Club at Charles and Madison Streets by
Dr. Maynard A. Clemens (1879-1961),
an innovative leader of higher education
in Maryland who had already found the
Baltimore College of Commerce, and
the College of Commerce at the University of Maryland, and who would in the future found Eastem College (1928) and
the Mount Vernon School of Law
(1935), to decide what should be done.
Among others at the meeting were
Eugene A. Edgett, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Clarence W.
Miles, Peoples Counsel; and Howell A.
King, then associated with the School of
Business Administration at the University of Maryland. A decision was reached
to found the University of Baltimore to
satisfy the need for a downtown law and
business school where young men and
women could receive a practical education without frills and their resultant
expense. In August 1925, the University
was granted its corporate charter by the
State of Maryland.
Charles W. Heuisler, a seventy-years
old Judge who had retired from the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City the previous November, agreed to serve as the
first Dean of the law school. A law faculty
of competent career lawyers who could
teach in the evenings was constructed.
The first location chosen for the school
was on the southeast corner of St. Paul
Street and Mount Vernon Place. The
first classes of the University of Baltimore
began there on October 1, 1925, for
sixty-two law students and one hundred
and fourteen business students.
The first class of thirty-eight law stu-

dents was graduated from the three-year
evening program in 1928, just in time for
the school to be accredited by Maryland
State Department of EdUcation. Even
though a college degree was not then
required by the school, some of its first
law graduates were holders of a
Bachelor's Degree. An annex was
opened at St. Paul and Centre Streets,
and in 1929, the former site ofthe Baltimore College of Dental Surgery at 847
N. Howard Street, now known to us as
"Howard Hall," was purchased and became the first permanent site of the
University of Baltimore.
State Senator William Milnes Maloy
(1874-1949) became the second Dean
of the Law school upon the death of
Dean Heuisler in February 1929. An
honor society named in memory of the
late Dean, to comprise the top ten percent of each graduating law class was established in March 1932, and continues
to this day.
DUring the first ten years of its
existence, the University of Baltimore
had three Presidents: Dr. Maynard A.
Clemens served as Acting Chancellor
until his resignation in 1926; he was succeeded by Dr. Wilbur F. Smith, elected
first President serving until 1933; and finally, Howell A. King, serving as Acting
President for about two years. On its
tenth anniversary in 1925, the University of Baltimore boasted nearly one
thousand graduates of its law and bUsiness schools.
In the fall of 1937, a two-year junior
college program was begun under the
supervision of Dr. Theodore Halbert
Wilson (1885), the University's
education advisor, Dr. Wilson was to
serve nearly three years in this capacity
until the Board of Trustees announced
his election as President in July 1940.
In 1940, the law shcool began offering
a two-year course toward a Master of
Laws Degree, graduating its first class of
LL. M's in 1942. The program continued until 1960, when it was discontinued. In 1946, Dean Maloy retired; Assistant Dean John H. Hessey (1890) became the third Dean of the Law
School. Post-war growth of the University prompted the purchase of the former
site of the Baltimore Athletic Club in
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